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X v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën: a step forward in a proper application of the ability-to-pay 
principle in cross-border situations?  
 
By Dr. Luca Cerioni (*) 
 
Introduction 
  Cases of taxpayers who receive the major part of their income in Member States other than the 
Member State of tax residence, and thus being denied tax advantages relating to their personal and 
family circumstances, have been “flocking” before the CJEU since the landmark 1995  Finanzamt 
Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker (Schumacker) ruling.1 These have been considered on the grounds of 
possible infringement of the free movement of workers or of the freedom of establishment.  Every 
case offers the CJEU the occasion to deal with additional aspects which were not brought to it s 
scrutiny in previous rulings. This note discusses the most recent case, X v. Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën (X),2  in the context of previous CJEU’s decisions,3  as regards both the criteria used in 
assessing such cases and the ultimate objective pursued by the CJEU.   
  From this twofold perspective, X may mark a step forward in the proper assessment of the ability-
to-pay of taxpayers receiving cross-border income.   
The factual circumstances and the legal background  
   A Dutch national was tax resident and owner of a dwelling in Spain during the relevant tax years. 
His income consisted of payments by two companies in which he held majority shareholdings, one 
of which was established in the Netherlands, the other in Switzerland. The income from the Dutch 
                                                                 
(*)  Lecturer in Tax Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh 
1 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker (C-279/93) [1995] ECR I-225 [1995] STC 306. 
2 X v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën  (C-283/15) [2017] ECR I-00000, decision issued February 2017. 
 
3 After the landmark Schumacker (C-279/93) case, above fn.1, [1995] STC 306 at [32] and [36]; amongst subsequent 
rulings,  inter alia: Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt (C-391/97) (Gschwind) [1999] ECR I-5451; [2001] STC 
331 at [27]; Zurstrassen v Administration des contributions directes (C-87/99) (Zurstrassen) [2000] ECR I-3337; [2001] 
STC 1102 at [21]; de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-385/00) (de Groot) [2002] ECR I-11819; [2004] STC 
1346 at [89] and [90]; Luxemburg v Lakebrink (C-182/06) (Lakebrink ) [2007] ECR I-6705; [2008] STC 2485 at [29] 
and [30]; Renneberg v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-527/06) (Renneberg) [2008] ECR I-7735 at [61]. 
source represented 60% of his overall taxable income, the income from the Swiss source represented 
40% and he received no income in Spain.  Under the applicable bilateral tax conventions (DTCs), the 
income from the Swiss source was taxed in Switzerland, and the income from the Netherlands source 
was taxed in the Netherlands. Netherlands tax legislation granted Dutch taxpayers resident in other 
Member States, and spending only part of the calendar year in the Netherlands, the option to elect to 
be subject to the tax regime applicable to resident taxpayers. Under this regime, income tax payable 
by individuals in the Netherlands includes a notional “income from residence”, consisting of deemed 
“advantages” of being owner of an occupied welling, against which taxpayers can set specific 
expenses. If the amount of those expenses exceeds the value of the “advantages”, taxpayers end up 
with a “negative income from residence” reducing their overall taxable income.  The taxpayer, on 
choosing to be subject to this regime, was subject to unlimited tax liability in the Netherland and was 
allowed to deduct the “negative income from residence” relating to his dwelling located in Spain, but 
this choice proved to be unfavourable. In fact, he ended up being liable to a tax greater than that which 
he would have had to pay if he had been permitted to deduct in its entirety the “negative income” 
arising from his dwelling located in Spain from Dutch income without opting to be treated in the same 
way as resident taxpayers. 
    The taxpayer claimed that this tax treatment was contrary to free movement provisions - although 
without specifying which fundamental freedom was invoked - and that these should be interpreted as 
meaning that a non-resident taxpayer may obtain the deduction of “negative income” relating to the 
dwelling owned by him without being compelled to elect to be treated in the same way as resident 
taxpayers.  
The transposition of the Schumacker principle to self-employed taxpayers  
    The CJEU, after placing the case at stake within the ambit of the freedom of establishment under 
Art. 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), started with a dual assertion. 
First, it stressed that “negative income” relating to immovable property located in the  Member State 
where a taxpayer is resident,  forms a tax advantage linked to his/her personal situation, which is 
relevant to the assessment of his overall ability to pay tax.4 Secondly, it acknowledged that the non-
resident taxpayer is put at a disadvantage, in comparison with resident taxpayers, to the extent that he 
is not allowed to deduct the “negative income”. The attention to the taxpayer’s cross-border situation, 
with regard to his overall ability-to-pay, was therefore the starting point of the EU’s reasoning.  
                                                                 
4 X case, above fn 3, para. 26 
     The CJEU then reiterated its Schumacker statement according to which different treatment 
between residents and non-residents is not generally discriminatory due to the non-comparability of 
situations – the resident usually derives most of his income from that member state, in contrast to the 
non-resident.5 Each is in an objectively different situation.6 The CJEU also reiterated that 
discrimination between a resident and a non-resident could arise only if, having regard to the very 
purpose and contents of national provisions at stake, each is in a comparable situation. This would be 
the case if the non-resident received insufficient income in either State to get the benefit of provisions 
intended to take into account of personal and family circumstances.7   
The CJEU then adapted mutatis mutandis the principles developed in relation to employees under the 
free movement of workers to self-employed taxpayers in relation to freedom of establishment. It noted 
the two cumulative conditions required for comparability with residents set out in Schumacker, i.e. 
the non-resident obtains the major part of income in the work State and the resident State is unable 
“to grant him the advantages which accrue from taking into account his aggregate income and his 
personal and family circumstances”.8 The conditions were both satisfied.  However there was another 
factual difference between the situation in Schumacker and the current case. In Schumacker, the 
taxpayer earned almost all his income in the non-resident state which refused him the tax advantage.  
In this case, he only received 60%. However the CJEU held that the important point was the fact that 
the residence State was unable to give relief because  the taxpayer did not receive any income in this 
State. As a consequence, the CJEU, by applying the principle set out in Schumacker, found that the 
non-resident taxpayer faced discrimination as his personal and family circumstances were taken into 
consideration in neither the State where he earned 60% of his overall income nor the residence State. 
The decisive criterion is whether it is impossible for a Member State to take into account  the personal 
and family circumstances of a taxpayer in the absence of sufficient taxable income, although such 
circumstances can otherwise be taken into account when there is sufficient income.9   
  So, in the first part of its ruling, the CJEU has applied the criteria for establishing the comparability 
between residents and non-residents that it had earlier applied in Schumacker to the case of non-
resident self-employed people,  an approach which has been referred to as the “overall approach” or 
“always somewhere approach”.10  After Schumacker, the CJEU has followed this approach in a 
                                                                 
5 X case, above fn 3, para.  27-31  
6 Id. 
7 X case, above fn 3, para.  34  
 
8 X case, above fn 3, para.  36-38.  
9 X case, above fn 3, para. 39-43. 
10 E.g., B.J.M. Terra, P.J. Wattel, European Tax Law, 6th edn. (Alphen aan der Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2012), 906–910;  
P.Wattel, Fiscal Cohesion, Fiscal Territoriality and Preservation of the (Balanced) Allocation of Taxing Powers; What 
number of rulings dealing with situations where a non-resident earned all or almost all of its income 
in the State of employment.11. So here, the CJEU finding can be regarded as consistent with previous 
case-law, both in its analysis of “negative income from residence” as being a relevant type of tax 
advantage (falling within the scope of the Lakebrink ruling12) aimed at taking into account 
circumstances affecting the overall ability to pay and, in its treatment of applying the freedom of 
establishment to self-employed people in equivalent fashion to the free movement of workers for 
employees.  
The pro-rata granting of personal deductions 
However, in the second part of the opinion, the CJEU dealt with an new important aspect of the 
obligation to grant tax advantages related to personal and family circumstances: how much relief does 
the state have to give?  For example, if the source state and the residence state (or two non-resident 
states) both have domestic rules which essentially give the same relief, the taxpayer could end up 
with a double deduction if he had sufficient income in each state. Should the source state be required 
to give less than a full deduction? The CJEU found that the obligation to take into account personal 
and family circumstances needs to be proportionately allocated between different “Member States of 
activities”13 in relation to the amount of taxable income in each state.  14  So in this case, the 
Netherlands was required to give relief for 60% of the tax advantage. The CJEU’s view was that the 
freedom, subject to EU law, of  Member States,  
“to allocate among themselves their powers to impose taxes, in particular to avoid the 
accumulation of  tax advantages, must be reconciled with the necessity that taxpayers of the 
Member States concerned  are assured that, ultimately all their personal and family 
circumstances will be duly taken into account, irrespective of how the Member States concerned 
have allocated that obligation amongst themselves.”15 16 
  In stating the need to achieve this reconciliation, the CJEU noted, 
“Were such reconciliation not to take place, the freedom of Member States to allocate the power 
to impose taxes among themselves would be liable to create inequality of treatment of the 
taxpayers concerned which, since that inequality would not be the result of disparities between 
the provisions of national tax law, would be incompatible with freedom of establishment (see, 
                                                                 
is the difference ? in D.Weber (ed.), The Influence of European Law on Direct Taxat ion, 139-157, at 154, Kluwer Law 
International, 2007. 
11  E.g., Lakebrink  (C-182/06), above fn 2, at [29];  Renneberg (C-527/06) above fn 2, at [61]. 
12 Lakebrink  (C-182/06), above fn 2, at [34]. 
13 “Member state of activities” was understood as meaning the member state which had the power to tax : X case, 
above fn 3, para. 45. 
14 Id, para. 48 
15 X case, above fn 3, para. 47   
16 Para 47 
to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2013, Imfeld and Garcet, C‑303/12, EU:C:2013:822, 
paragraphs 70 and 77). 17 
This suggests that disadvantages caused by disparities between national laws cannot be removed by 
the  CJEU, although inequality of treatment deriving from  the failure to grant full tax advantages    
must be addressed  The CJEU, by insisting on the word “reconciliation”, appears to mean that two 
objectives must be simultaneously achieved: on the one hand,  ensuring taxpayer’s right to get 100% 
of the available deductions for personal and family circumstances (which right trumps Member 
States’ freedom); on the other hand, ensuring that these deductions are not duplicated (i.e., that the 
taxpayer does not obtain, in the two jurisdictions considered together, more than 100% of deductions 
for the same personal and family circumstances).    
As noted in the above quote, the CJEU referred to its  previous decision in Imfeld and Garcet. In this 
case, the Court required the residence state to give full relief for personal and family circumstances , 
even if the taxpayer also received relief from the state of source and thus received a double tax 
advantage. This double advantage had to be tolerated as it resulted from the parallel application by 
two Member States of their tax laws, as agreed in DTCs between themselves.18  In Imfeld and Garcet 
, the CJEU appears to have accepted  the opinion of the Advocate General that the CJEU lacks 
competence to coordinate national tax systems in order to prevent double tax advantages.19   In X, 
however, the disadvantage was caused by discrimination, not disparity.  The quoted CJEU’s wording 
would seem to imply that, if a taxpayer in a cross-border situation suffers an inequality of treatment 
only because the law of the involved countries is different, that disparity is admissible.  However, 
such wording would also seem to imply that, if the taxpayer suffers an inequality of treatment because 
the disparity between the law of the involved countries causes a discrimination (i.e, causes a situation 
where the taxpayers benefits from full deductions nowhere), that disparity is no longer admissib le 
and the reconciliation between the two objectives must take place.  
 The CJEU seemingly made, in the quoted wording, this distinction between two categories of 
disparities. Nevertheless,  it can also be noted that all disparities derive, in practical terms, from the 
lack of coordination between national laws,  and that Member States can coordinate with each other 
by allocating taxing powers among themselves for the purpose of preventing the accumulation of tax 
advantages too.   
                                                                 
17 Guido Imfeld and Natalie Garcet v. Belgian State  (C-303/12) (Imfeld and Garcet) [2013] ECR I-822, para. 70 
18 Id., para. 78 
19 Id., Opinion of the Advocate General, para 83, 84 and 85. 
    The end result is that a situation which was tolerated in Imfeld and Garcet – i.e. a situation where 
the taxpayer accumulates double tax advantages due to a DTC failing to allocate to one Member State 
alone the responsibility to grant deductions – was seemingly regarded as unacceptable in X, due to 
the CJEU stressing the freedom of Member States to allocate taxing power (specifically) with a view 
to prevent the accumulation of tax advantages.        
   So, as noted earlier, the CJEU in X ruled that the only possible method of achieving this twofold 
goal of protecting the freedom  of member states and of respecting personal and family reliefs was to 
permit the taxpayer a claim in each Member State of activity (assuming that the State grants that type 
of relief or advantage), in proportion to the share of his income received within each such Member 
State.20 In this respect, it also specified that the taxpayer needs to provide to the competent national 
authorities all the information on his global income needed by them to determine that proportion. In 
X the CJEU fully accepted, therefore, the pro-rata granting of tax advantages related to personal and 
family circumstances by all Member States having the power to tax income, from the activities of a 
non-resident self-employed taxpayer, received within the territory of each jurisdiction, irrespective 
of where the activities are actually performed.  
Furthermore, the CJEU noted stated that, in the event that the non-resident taxpayer receives part of 
his income in a non-Member State (as he did here) and receives no income in his residence state (as 
he did here), this makes no difference to the proportionate allocation. It noted the irrelevance of the 
receipt of third country income to the non-discrimination obligation imposed on Member States under 
the TFEU’s provisions on the freedom of establishment.  
Finally, the CJEU declined to deal with a further question raised by the referring court. This was 
whether the responses concerning the proportional granting of deductions would still apply if the 
residence State gave a similar tax relief. The CJEU declined to deal with this question, simply by 
repeating that X received no income in Spain during the tax years at stake, and that – accordingly – 
he had no taxable income. The question was hypothetical and as such inadmissible.21   
  Nevertheless, this unanswered question would be relevant to the case where a Member State taxes 
the worldwide income of his tax residents (as is often occurs for individuals). Here the residence State 
would be able to give a similar tax relief because it would consider the foreign income as taxable 
income.  This is discussed further in the next section.   
  Toward a European ability-to-pay principle?   
    The pro-rata granting of personal and family tax had been previously rejected, in principle, in De 
Groot.22  So, has the CJEU changed its ultimate objective in relation to the consideration of the cross-
border ability-to-pay of the concerned taxpayers? Commentators had already raised the issue as to 
whether the CJEU could impose a proportional application of the ability-to-pay principle,23 by 
requiring the proportional granting of deductions for personal and family circumstances in home and 
                                                                 
20 Id, para. 48 
21 X case, above fn 3, para. 54 and 55. 
22 De Groot fn 2. 
23 F.Vanistendael, Ability to pay in European Community Law , 23 EC Tax Review 121-134, 134 (2014) 
host states.24 Accordingly, it could well be questioned whether, in X, the CJEU has incorporated a 
proportional application of the ability-to-pay principle in the acquis communautaire.25   
  De Groot concerned a Dutch resident who earned more than 60% of his total employment income 
in three other Member States and obtained personal deductions in none of them. The Netherlands 
disallowed a proportion of Dutch personal deductions, corresponding to the proportion of non-Dutch 
income to overall income and the CJEU found that this disallowance created a restriction to the free 
movement of workers under Art 45 of the TFEU. There had been no undertaking by the states of 
employment to grant these deductions either by virtue of their domestic law or under a DTC with the 
residence State.26 A Dutch attempt to claim a justification for this on the basis that it would have been 
disproportionate in terms of tax loss to place the obligation to grant all personal allowances on the 
residence State in the absence of allowances granted by the source State was rejected by the CJEU 
on the ground that a loss of tax revenues can never justify restricting a fundamental freedom.27 
Ultimately, in De Groot, the ECJ made the proportional restriction of personal deductions by the 
residence State conditional upon some relief being granted by each source state (under a DTC or 
under national law).  In De Groot the CJEU had, therefore, upheld the “always somewhere approach” 
as regards the ultimate objective to be achieved, i.e. in respect of the granting of full deductions linked 
to personal and family circumstances. To this extent, the X ruling can thus be seen as fully consistent 
with De Groot.  
  Nevertheless, the situations in De Groot and X are considerably different. In De Groot, the taxpayer 
was complaining about his treatment at the hands of his state of residence and this  state had taxing 
powers on an amount of income that would have allowed this jurisdiction to grant the deductions .  
This means that the disadvantage suffered by the taxpayer falls within the category of a restriction, 
whereas in X, the disadvantage was caused by discrimination.  As a result of this difference between 
the situations at stake in De Groot and in X,  in De Groot the proportional granting of personal 
deductions was (unsuccessfully) advocated by the concerned national Government, whereas in X it 
was  unconditionally requested by the CJEU. In X, the proportional granting was regarded as the only 
possible method of achieving two important objectives.   
   But why should it matter whether there is a restriction or discrimination? These two objectives  (to 
prevent the improper accumulation of tax advantages on the one hand, and to ensure that all 
deductions for personal and family circumstances are granted on the other) are both instrumental  to 
a  proper assessment of the ability-to-pay. Such an assessment would seek to prevent both un 
underestimation of the ability to pay (which would occur if the taxpayers enjoyed full deductions for 
the same personal circumstances in two jurisdictions) and an overestimation of the ability to pay 
(which would occur if the taxpayer was refused a deduction by both countries).  
     The accumulation of tax advantages had been regarded as tolerable by the CJEU in Imfeld and 
Garcet, in essence, due to its lack of competence for coordinating national tax systems in the absence 
of an agreed allocation of the granting of tax advantages to only one of the two jurisdictions.28 
Conversely, in X, the CJEU showed awareness that the accumulation of tax advantages would prevent 
a proper assessment of the ability-to-pay when it indicated the need to ensure Member States’ freedom 
                                                                 
24 Vanistendael, above fn XX,  134.  
25 As suggested by F.A. Garcia Prats, Revisiting Schumacker: Source, Residence and Citizenship in the ECJ Case-Law 
on Direct Taxation, in  I.Richelle, W.Schon & E.Traversa (ed.), Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union, 
Springer, 2013, 23.  
26 Garcia Prats, above fn xx,at 101 and 102. 
27 Garcia Prats, above fn xx,at 103. 
28 See H.Niehsten, Growing impetus for harmonization of personal and family allowances: current state of affairs of the 
Schumacker –doctrine after Imfeld and Garcet, in EC Tax Review 4,  2015, 185-201, at 194; A.Pace, Cross-Border 
Family Fiscal Aspects in the Full Potential Impact of ECJ Case-Law,  in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Tributario  1, 2017. 
to allocate taxing power in particular to avoid the accumulation of tax advantages. Furthermore it did 
so without verifying whether the concerned jurisdiction had actually prevented this accumulat ion 
when allocating taxing powers between themselves.  
   Accordingly, X appears to have taken a key step forward compared with both De Groot and Imfeld 
and Garcet  towards allowing a proper assessment of the ability-to-pay of individuals in cross-border 
situations.  This might also imply a step forward towards the development, ultimately, of an EU law 
principle of ability-to-pay.29 The essence of this principle would consist of matching fractiona l 
taxation of the overall income by Member States with fractional granting of the entire tax advantages. 
The residence state would lose its right to tax world-wide income, but would only be required to give 
proportionate reliefs. This solution has been advocated by academic literature, not only in relation to 
personal tax reliefs but regard to issue of cross-border corporate losses set-off as well.30  
 
What if the resident state adopts worldwide taxation? 
  The definition of “Member State of activity” adopted by the CJEU may potentially undermine the 
application of the ability to pay principle. As noted earlier, this was used by the CJEU as meaning a 
state in which there is taxable income a right to tax, rather than any actual taxable activity.  The 
question arises as to whether or not the residence state operating worldwide taxation has to grant 
proportionate  tax advantages even though the taxpayer performs no activity and gains no income in 
its territory.  Neither this, nor the possibility of a tax residence conflict, were mentioned in X.   
Assuming a residence state taxing on a worldwide basis, where the taxpayer has no domestic income, 
it is not obvious under X how to apportion the granting of reliefs between the various states. However, 
bear in mind that, in X, the Court noted “that that reconciliation can be achieved only by” 
proportionate granting of reliefs. Perhaps apportioning reliefs should not apply where there is another 
way to take into account personal circumstances. Any residence state taxing on a worldwide basis 
should have all the information necessary to assess the overall ability to pay and of course would 
have taxing power on foreign income too,  This gives raises the question, firstly,  whether the 
residence State should grant full deductions or proportional deductions, and, secondly, whether the 
proper assessment of the ability to pay (in terms of prevention of both underestimation and 
overestimation of the ability to pay) would also be compromised in case of tax residence conflict.  
    As regards the first question, it can be noted at the outset that, if the residence State applies the 
worldwide taxation principle, this jurisdiction (unless adopting the exemption method to elimina te 
double taxation) has taxing powers on foreign-sourced income, and it would be able to assess this 
income - thanks to the automatic information exchange under Art. 8 of the Administrat ive 
                                                                 
29 The only exception to this outcome would arise where part of total income is received from extra -EU countries. Such 
countries would not be under an obligation to grant proportional of personal advantages. This means that the matching 
between the fraction of income received and the fraction of tax advantages granted would only exist for the overall share 
of the total income received within the EU.      
 
30 K.Van Raad, Fractional Taxation of Multi-State Income of EU resident individuals, A Proposal, in K.Andersson, 
P.Meltz &. C. Silfverberger (eds), Liber Amicorum Sven-Olon Lodin 211-221 (Kluwer, 2001); M.Mossner, Source v. 
Residence – an EU Perspective, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, IBFD, 501-506, 2006; L.Cerioni, The 
Never-Ending Issue of Cross-Border Losses Compensation within the EU: Reconciling Balanced Allocation of Taxing 
Rights and Cross-Border Ability-to-Pay,  24 EC Tax Review 5, 268-280, at 277.   
Cooperation Directive31 -  even in case of underreporting by the concerned taxpayer. In the case of 
worldwide taxation by the residence State, its taxing power would seem to qualify even this State as 
“Member State of activity” together with source States.  
    As a matter of fact,  several States, within the EU, apply worldwide taxation with foreign tax credit 
for resident individuals. Consequently, one could argue that, if in all  cases potentially involving  these 
jurisdictions,  the proportional granting of personal deductions were to be replaced by the granting of 
full deductions by the residence State alone, there would be, de facto, a significant limit to the 
outcome reached in X (fractional taxation of cross-border income and fractional granting of 
deductions). Although it could be noted that, in these situations, due to the residence State’s ability 
to grant the personal deductions at issue, there would be no discrimination,  in terms of tax revenues 
of Member States there may well be  implications which would further contrast with the interest of 
Member States and, ultimately, contrast with the rationale behind the CJEU’s consistent approach of 
not requiring a residence State where a taxpayer has no (or insufficient) taxable income to grant the 
tax advantages (an approach without which such residence State would obviously suffer revenue 
losses).  
    In fact, the full granting of deductions by the residence State alone could even – in some specific 
cases -  be detrimental to the tax revenues of the residence Member State if the foreign tax credit that 
this State would need to grant for tax paid in the source States, were able, on its own, to offset the 
additional revenues generated by taxable foreign income. This could be the case if taxation in the 
source State were either equal or higher than in the residence State.  In this scenario,  the taxable base 
and tax revenues would be shifted from the residence State to the source States where the activity 
were to be carried out, as this latter would grant no deduction, despite having taxing powers under 
Art. 14 (or under Art. 15) of DTCs.  Conversely, the tax base would be shifted in favour of the 
residence State if this last State, despite applying worldwide taxation, were to grant only the fraction 
of the personal deductions corresponding to the fraction of income actually earned there, but in this 
case there would be an overassessment of the ability to pay in the residence State, which 
overassessment would find  a justification neither in X nor in Imfeld and Garcet nor in De Groot.   
 Additionally, a practical consequence of the full granting of personal advantages by the residence 
State alone, in a context of considerable differences between the effective tax rates in the various 
State, may consist of an incentive, for those taxpayers who find themselves in situations where they 
can easily move the connecting factors for tax residence, to engage in tax-shopping practices (aimed 
at maximising the overall amount of deductions against the overall gross amount of income), i.e. to 
implement forms of international tax avoidance, just after the EU, following the OECD’s BEPS 
initiative, has introduced measures to fight cross-border tax avoidance when implemented by 
multinational companies32.   
  For these reasons,  a general response to the first issue (whether the residence State, if applying the 
worldwide taxation, should grant full deductions or proportional deductions) would seem to be 
difficult to draw, because both the full granting of deductions and the proportional granting of 
deductions would risk generating outcomes contrasting with a proper assessment of the ability to pay 
and with the interest of Member States’ revenues.    
      Moreover,  the CJEU’s wording leaves completely open the issue as to whether, in the event of 
tax residence conflict between two (or more) of the concerned jurisdictions,  the proportional pro-
                                                                 
31 Directive 2011/16 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC [2011] OJ 
L 64/1,  Art. 8 (1). 
32 E.g., Council Directive 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly 
affect the functioning of the internal market (Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive). 
quota granting of personal deductions would still apply. The issue could be really important because, 
where an individual taxpayer carries out a professional activity in a Member States and, for 
performing this activity, remains in the country over 183 days during a tax year, under the nationa l 
tax legislation the taxpayer generally becomes tax resident in the country at stake, whilst keeping the 
tax residence under the tax law of its jurisdiction of origin too, if he maintains links there.  In this 
situation, the tie-breaker rules under Art. 4(2) of DTCs based on the OECD Model would apply and 
would need to be used to allocate the tax residence to only one of the jurisdictions, but, in case of 
different national interpretations of the tie-breaker rules which take priority over the nationa lity 
criteria in the hierarchical order of criteria laid down by Art. 4(2), the double tax residence situation 
risks remaining unaltered, unless the taxpayer can rely on a mandatory arbitration clause in the 
provisions governing the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) of the specific DTC.  Until the tax 
residence conflict is solved, if both jurisdictions apply the worldwide taxation principle and do not 
exempt foreign income related to professional activity (or to employment), the taxpayer at stake can 
find himself subject to worldwide taxation in both countries and may need to require foreign tax credit 
relief in both of them, for the tax paid in the other jurisdictions.   
   In this case,  even if the definition of “Member State of activity” given by the CJEU in X, due to its 
being determined by taxing powers of the jurisdictions concerned,   were to imply the proportional 
granting by both States, the  proportional granting itself would risk placing the taxpayer in a position 
where he enjoys the full  tax deductions in neither of the two States whilst being subject to unlimited 
taxation in both of them, which would defeat one of the two key ultimate objectives pursued by the 
CJEU. The taxpayer would need to avoid both this situation, and a situation where one of the countries 
would grant no deductions despite applying worldwide taxation (which situation would create a 
disadvantage for the taxpayer exercising a fundamental freedom in comparison with taxpayers 
carrying out their activity only in a domestic jurisdiction).  
   To do so, the taxpayer – due to its being subject to worldwide taxation in both countries pending 
the tax residence conflict, and due to the tax residence conflict preventing even any allocation of the 
power to grant deductions between residence state and source state – would need to be allowed to 
enjoy full deductions in both countries for all period during which he is subject to worldwide taxation 
in both. Nevertheless,  the full deductions in both countries would risk jeopardizing another objective 
accepted by the CJEU, i.e. the accumulation of tax advantages.  
  Accordingly,  it is evident that – particularly in situations of tax residence conflict – only the 
overcoming of worldwide taxation and its replacement with a “model” consisting of fractiona l 
taxation of the overall income in each country coupled with fractional granting of personal 
deductions, can ensure the achievement of both objectives indicated by the CJEU in X. Should this 
“model” be accepted, which would, in essence, lead to a European principle of ability-to-pay, this 
step would ultimately mark the introduction, for individuals, of a scheme equivalent to what the re-
proposed common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) scheme would be for companies, and 
this outcome would be fully consistent with the inclusion of both companies and individuals within 
the scope of the freedom of establishment (whose infringement was at stake in X) under Art. 49 and 
54 of the TFEU.     
    Conclusions        
      In X,  the CJEU has arguably paved the way to the development of an EU law principle of ability-
to-pay, based on the fractional taxation of the overall income by each Member State (in proportion to 
its share of the taxpayer’s global income) and on the corresponding fractional granting of tax 
advantages, but it had limited its scope, by indicating it as a solution to overcome situations of 
discrimination arising out of the risk of taxpayers not being fully granted personal deductions.  
Whereas this first move towards the development of this principle undoubtedly marks a step forward, 
in comparison with previous rulings, in allowing a proper cross-border assessment of the ability- to-
pay of individual taxpayers earning incomes in two or more Member States, the potential non-
matching between fractional taxation and fractional deductions where the Member State of residence 
adopts the worldwide taxation principle,  and/ or in situations where only a restriction – not a 
discrimination – is at stake, may indicate that the ruling has not really overcome the risk of outcomes 
such as those in De Groot and in Imfeld and Garcet.  In fact, the limitation of the scope of the ruling 
may indicate that, outside the cases of discrimination, the potential developing the “model” consisting 
of fractional taxation coupled with fractional deduction has been even stopped, and, from this 
perspective, the ruling would risk marking a step backward. This would be so because the dual goal 
that the CJEU indicated, i.e. the reconciliation between the prevention of accumulation of tax 
advantages and the need to ensure that the taxpayer benefit from the full deductions,  would deserve 
to be pursued in all situations, and the fractional taxation coupled with fractional deduction would be 
the most effective way of achieving this outcome.   
     Consequently, it would ideally be for the EU legislator, following the X ruling, to introduce a 
general harmonising EU measure intended to overcome worldwide taxation by the residence State 
when its taxpayers accrue incomes in other Member States and to introduce this “model”, to the 
benefit – ultimately – both of legal certainty for taxpayers and of the tax bases of Member States 
themselves.       
 
 
